The USG will continue to support operations to achieve its national security objectives. With the potential for failing states and instability throughout the world, the Obama Administration will have to decide the appropriate level of USG commitment to support operations in other nations to foster stability and enhance prosperity. The current S/CRS framework for stabilization provides for deploying FACTs but does not give a criterion to aid in the decision. Criteria for employment of FACTs, the most extensive level of U.S. commitment of interagency personnel to an operation, are useful to enable this decision. The potential criterion for employing a FACT includes five elements. These elements are: when there is a lack of a national host country government; when there is a need for multiple expertise in stability operations conducted over extensive areas; when the best training of the local institutions is through modeling behavior by direct coaching; when conditions in the regional or local areas overwhelm the existing government institutions; and finally, in concert with major military operations. The suggested criterion provides a point of departure for policy makers in the new administration concerning deployment of the emergent interagency capability.
WHEN TO DEPLOY THE FIELD ADVANCE CIVILIAN TEAM
The U.S. government (USG) has a long history of conducting nation building or stability operations. The complexity of these types of operations prompted a 1997
Presidential Decision Directive to develop an interagency approach for reconstruction and stabilization. 1 Although efforts to achieve this interagency capability have gained momentum over the past three years, the initial pool of experts is not expected to be available for deployment until late 2009. While coordination at the national level and with regional combatant commanders is continuous, the current employment of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Iraq and Afghanistan provide a view of potential future deployment of interagency experts. As the future strategic environment anticipates failed or failing states and continued instability throughout the world, the U.S.
will likely continue to support operations in other nations that foster stability and enhance prosperity in order to improve these fragile states and promote U.S. national security.
In 2005, President Bush created the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction
and Stabilization (S/CRS) to focus the USG's response for future reconstruction and stabilization operations in foreign countries. 2 To date, the S/CRS has developed a framework to meet the planning and operational employment of an interagency capacity building team. This team focuses the efforts of the various executive branch departments of the USG towards enhancing the ability of another national government to be responsive to the needs of their own people. highly specialized units, all using standardized equipment and pre-trained personnel. 36 The ERU appears to be equivalent to the FACT in the S/CRS model.
In reviewing the operations of IOs and similar organizations, several items are apparent that may apply to the S/CRS model. One item is the need for rapid, worldwide employment of teams. The second item suggests the team requires some level of expertise. The third reflects a tiered structure must exist for developing and implementing operations. Fourth, these organizations attempt to remain neutral and impartial; setting their agenda by the assistance they provide to people in need. USAID, one of many USG agencies, already leverages the first three items to implement programs to achieve its strategic goals in support of the National Security Strategy.
However, the fourth item is the one that limits the USG's ability to collaborate with otherthan-government organizations. 37 When the U.S. needs to influence a nation to achieve a security objective, the NGOs, IOs, and similar organizations are not always eager to collaborate. This situation leads the United States to employing its own personnel or organizations while building upon the existing programs in the host nation.
Upon review of the future strategic environment and experiences of NGOs and
IOs, it appears the on-going S/CRS-led efforts will result in an interagency capability for The purpose of the ACT is to integrate planning, resource allocation, and operations for the ambassador in order to achieve unity of effort. 39 In 2008, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates highlighted the significance of an interagency and international effort to assist nations and local populations to "promote local participation in government and economic programs to spur development" as part of the National Defense Strategy. 40 This focus on the significance of good local governance in the defense strategy demonstrates the importance of unity of effort by non-military agents that is precisely the role the FACT. An ACT would employ a FACT in order to gain firsthand knowledge of the situation on the ground in the host nation in order to achieve unity of effort. The mission of the FACT would be to understand the requirements on the ground, determine any limitations for planned operations, and provide feedback on the execution of the operations. The FACT also provides oversight for execution of U.S.
funds. The FACT provides guidance in governance, rule of law, essential services, and economic development.
One criterion for employment of a FACT is the lack of a host nation national government. One of the lessons from Iraq is that "developing the capacity of people and systems is as important as bricks and mortar reconstruction." ACT, in conjunction with the national government, may develop a plan that meets all the needs of the local populace for achieving any objective from enhanced rule of law to improved governance to humanitarian aid, but without local resources or leadership available for execution, the plan will not achieve the desired results. The FACT can step in to provide that additional level of supervision and support to the local government.
The FACT provides feedback on the ongoing operations, identifies new requirements, and assesses the impact of limitations.
The final criterion for employment of a FACT is in concert with major operations conducted by the military. James Carafano, an assistant director at the Heritage Foundation with a focus on defense and national security issues, documented that the U.S. military has conducted an operation related to peacekeeping, peacemaking, or post-conflict occupation roughly every two years since the end of the Cold War. 46 In respect and awareness of this history, the U.S. Army includes stability operations as well as offensive and defensive operations, as part of full spectrum operations in its recently published FM 3-0, Operations. 47 The USG can expect that any future employment of the joint force will include some aspect of stability operations. As The USG will continue to support operations to achieve its national security objectives. With the potential for failing states and instability throughout the world, the Obama Administration will have to decide the appropriate level of USG commitment to support operations in other nations to foster stability and enhance prosperity. The current S/CRS framework for stabilization provides for deploying FACTs but does not
give a criterion to aid in the decision. Criteria for employment of FACTs, the most extensive level of U.S. commitment of interagency personnel to an operation, are useful to enable this decision. The previously suggested criterion provides a point of departure for policy makers in the new administration concerning deployment of the emergent interagency capability.
